operative plant provide the motivation for cooperative members to establish arrangements Payment arrangements among members of a that determine the manner in which members' cooperative play a critical role in the performdeliveries are coordinated. In this regard, Trifon ance of the cooperative. 
A group of individuals with common interbe characterized by three groups: the members, ests usually attempts to further those interests.
the board of directors, and the management Olson points out that unless there is coercion team. The dominance of one group over another or some type of device to make individuals act and of coalitions within the dominant group in their common interests, rational self-centered affect the types of arrangements generated acindividuals will not act to achieve their common cording to the interests and objectives of the group interests. dominant elements. Shaffer addresses some of A cooperative enterprise is an organization the complications involving alternative linkages owned and operated by its members which opbetween ownership and control of farmer coerates solely for their benefits. A processing operatives. He argues that one can reasonably cooperative, which processes members' raw expect the management of the cooperative to product by altering its form, faces the problem be more responsive to members' preferences of best coordinating the deliveries of the memthan in investor-owned firms. In this study, it bers who may have conflicting interests in the is assumed that payment arrangements are set operation of the cooperative plant. This is dif-, by the dominant group, but such a group is not ferent than the case of vertically integrated explicitly identified. In doing so, the dominant investor-owned firms where the raw product is group would set up the environment in which an input in the production process and not a its objective is best accomplished. The diffivehicle of returns in itself. One way to discern culties involved in cooperative decisionmaking, the characteristics of cooperative associations in particular identification of a cooperative obfrom investor-owned firms is by considering the jective, are identified by Aresvik and Zusman. principles that govern the relationships beIn the foregoing discussion, questions relattween a cooperative and its members. Abrahaming to the nature of the cooperative objective sen states the following principles: (1) service are raised. Ladd (1982) argues that maximizaat cost by the cooperative, (2) member control tion of total net returns is the most plausible and ownership, and (3) limited return on capsingle objective for a cooperative enterprise. ital.
Helmberger and Hoos argue that the cooperative Arrangements, as used in this paper, are formaximizes cooperative surplus, leading to an mal commitments (e.g., contracts) that specify equilibrium given by the point where net avhow members' raw product is to be marketed, erage revenue product from the members' raw that is, establishing rules by which net savings product equals the supply function.of the mem-(costs) of the cooperative and fixed processing bers. LeVay and Zusman challenge the existence capacity are allocated to the members. Conflicts of a single, unambiguous cooperative objective and interdependence in the operation of a coon the grounds that conflict of interests among the members does not allow an objective deftotal net returns of the cooperative and a set inition.
of subprograms that represents the members' Nonetheless, one can reasonably postulate that problem. Management influences members' bethe members' objective is the maximization of havior in the model through the pricing of fixed their own net returns and that payment arrangecosts. Variable costs are exactly allocated to ments significantly affect the behavior of memeach service or delivery. From the analysis, Bar bers, and hence, the performance of the suggests that fixed costs must be allocated in cooperative. The manner in which a cooperative accordance to the shadow price of resources enterprise compensates (charges) its members but concludes that maximum cooperative proffor their contribution to (use of) the cooperits are unattainable. ative plays a crucial role in providing incentives Buccola and Subaei consider ex post payment for their collective welfare and in determining arrangements. They analyze the risk and distrithe distribuiton of returns among the members.
butional implications of alternative product In a processing cooperative, a payment system pooling schemes once net savings of the coallocates cooperative net savings among the operative have been determined. They do not, members and influences decisions on product however, characterize surplus as depending quality, size of deliveries, and when to deliver upon the payment scheme. Ladd (1974) , on the raw product for processing. Payment arthe other hand, addresses alternative cooperarangements can be viewed as instruments totive objectives. Results indicates that an efficient potentially enhance the performance of quantity maximizing cooperative differs from cooperatives. Knutson notes that most buy-sell an efficient price maximizing cooperative and cooperatives lack sophistication in marketing.
both differ from a profit maximizing cooperaHe also states that committed commodity martive. Zusman concludes that the Pareto optimal keting cooperatives hold the potential for imsolution in a marketing cooperative is achieved proving price discovery largely through through allocating cost in accordance with marimproved grading systems, timing of marketing, ginal cost and allocating the remaining surplus and establishment of more realistic location through side payments. price differentials.
The conclusions of Bar, Hardie, and Zusman The objective of this paper is to provide a are congruous with each other and to the findmethodological framework for the empirical ings of the present study. The model presented assessment of alternative payment arrangements in this paper concerns alternative ex ante rules among members of processing cooperatives. An of apportioning cooperative savings. The probempirical model is developed for Florida suglem is conceptualized as a bi-level programming arcane processing cooperatives and three payproblem in which payment rules are set at level ment systems are analyzed. These payments are 1 (by the dominant group within the cooperbased on sugarcane weight, sugar weight, and ative) and members react at level 2 by trying use value of the delivered sugarcane.
to maximize their own net returns given the payment scheme set at level 1. Thus, the model PREVIOUS WORK is analogous to the one presented by Hardie in the sense that members' behavior is differenStudies with similar objectives as undertaken tiated from the behavior of a collective deciin this paper include analyses by Bar, Hardie, sionmaker. Hardie's model does not incorporate Buccola and Subaei, Ladd (1974) , and Zusman.
alternative rules of allocating cooperative surThese studies are not primarily concerned with plus (or costs). In the model proposed in this payment arrangements per se and, with the expaper, the cooperative always strives to maxiception of Buccola and Subaei, do not provide mize total profits but the cooperative objective empirical results.
embodies the payment arrangement and the Hardie and Bar developed linear programmembers' behavior. In addition, the model inming models for cooperatives and both precludes spatio-temporal and plant capacity facscribe efficient pricing solutions from the shadow tors that affect the operation of processing values. Hardie's model allows for various grades cooperatives. of raw material and suggests pricing each product in accordance with its shadow price. Helm-FLORIDA SUGARCANE PROCESSING berger et al. discuss the shortcomings of this COOPERATIVES approach. Bar presents a model based on the decomposition principle of linear programIn Florida, sugarcane processing cooperatives ming. The model is composed of a master proaccount for approximately 35% of all cane program in which management strives to maximize cessed (Zepp) . The Florida sugar industry is located in the southern end of Lake Okeechobee and comprises more than 340,000 acres which produced 1,121,490 short tons of raw sugar in the 1980-81 season (Alvarez et al. of Florida sugarcane cooperatives in relation to processing capacity. The harvest season extends its members and other involved segments. These from October to April when sugar accumulates cooperatives harvest, haul, and process memin the cane (Alvarez et al.) . Conflicts arise among bers' sugarcane and produce and sell the sugar.
the members because of the perishability of These cooperatives pay members from net savsugarcane (storage cannot be utilized), and ings generated from the sales of sugar less fixed members' preferences for delivery time. These and variable costs (harvesting, hauling, and proconflicts are settled, in part, through the imcessing). This paper deals with rules of apporposition of individual delivery quotas to ensure tioning this surplus; i.e., the broken line that adequate deliveries in both "good" and "bad" flows from the cooperative plant to the members delivery times within a processing season. in Figure 1 . As is customary in cooperatives, Sugarcane cooperative members influence the Florida sugarcane cooperatives pay an initial quality and quantity of deliveries through the price at the time of delivery and distribute a selection of varieties of cane, area of cane culdeferred patronage at the end of the accounting tivated, and times of deliveries. There are at period.
least five reasons for variation in the value added Florida sugarcane cooperatives currently pay generated across varieties. Varieties of cane diftheir members according to the amount of "net fer by (1) tons of cane produced per acre, (2) standard tons"' of cane delivered in an attempt sugar content, (3) fiber content, which affects to compensate for the amount of sugar extracted ease of processing or time to process, (4) growfrom the delivered raw product (Crane et al.) .
ing costs, and (5) temporal quality and tonnage Payment is adjusted by the average harvest and patterns (Meade and Chen, Miller and James, transportation costs per ton of cane delivered.
Alvarez et al.). Since members are currently paid according to
The payment problem for a Florida sugarcane sugar delivered and sugar content in the cane cooperative is to allocate the net savings of the increases as the season progresses (Alvarez et cooperative to the members. The payment sysal.), members prefer to deliver their cane as tem directly affects members' behavior, and late as possible to increase their revenues.
hence, affects the level and distribution of net Sugarcane processing cooperatives face the returns among the members. The balance of this problem of determining the best use of limited paper consists of three parts. First, the payment 2 Field trash and cane tops are subtracted from the delivered cane to obtain "net tons" of cane. "Standard tons" of cane are net tons of cane adjusted with a quality factor which is determined upon analysis of the sucrose content in the cane juice (Meade and Chen). systems to be instituted are defined. Then, a biunder payment system k for the delivery of the level programming model is developed for the raw product. For simplicity, it is assumed that problem. Finally, the model parameters are esthe cooperative does not retain any earnings, timated and empirical results are presented and or conversely, that members have no liquidity discussed.
preference with respect to deferred payments. Even though an infinite number of payment PAYMENT SYSTEMS systems can be devised to allocate equation (1), three are considered which seem plausible and Consider a sugarcane processing cooperative are commonly used by the sugarcane industry composed of m members with closed member-(Meade and Chen). ship. The cooperative only processes members' raw product and the members are committed First, consider a payment system that allocates to deliver all their production to the coopercooperative surplus based on tonnage of raw ative.
material delivered. The price per unit of Y is Let Y,, denote the amount of raw product Py = CS/Y, and the payment for the delivery produced from variety v (v= 1,...,V), delivered of Yft is: in processing period t (t= 1,...,T) from field f (f= 1 ,...,Fi), belonging to member i (i = 1 ,...,m).
() Y, = P, Let Hv be a binary choice variable which equals Under this payment system, a grower's payment one if field f belonging to member i is harvested is directly proportional to the tons of cane in period t, planted with variety v, and equals delivered regardless of the sugar or fiber content zero otherwise. Define J and H as the vectors of the cane. containing Y, and Hlf, respectively. Let Y denote total raw product delivered by the memSecond, consider a system in which members bers. The inner product of J and H equals Y, are paid for the amount of sugar that is extracted i.e., H *J = Y. Further, define Y as the vector from their deliveries. Payment is based on Z of raw product deliveries for the planted fields rater than on Y and a "price can be expressed containing all nonzero cross products of H as Pz = CS/Z. The payment for the delivery of and Y 1 f.
Ytv is: Assume the cooperative variable cost function, C(Y), is separable so that the cost of (4) PAYft = Pz Zt,, harvesting, transporting, and processing each where Zf represents the finished product member's delivery can be allocated to that equivalent of Yf, i.e., the sugar extracted from grower. This assumption is reasonable since y Florida sugarcane cooperatives compute variaThird, consider the case where members are ble expenses per ton delivered (harvesting, paid on a use vale basis, and thus they are hauling, processing) and they record the amount paid for the quantity of sugar extracted from of raw material and variety contained in each their deliveries adjusted for the cost of prodelivery. Let Z, Ps , and FCC denote the total cessing and other cooperative services. Thus, amount of sugar produced by the cooperative, payment for the delivery of Y~ is: the price at which the cooperative sells Z, and the fixed cooperative cost, respectively.
3 Then, costs can be allocated in several ways. Sharing FCC based on the amount of raw material is The payment problem for one criterion. In Bar's model, the cooperative concerns the allocation of cooperative surplus asences members through the allocation of defined in equation
(1) among the members. influences members through the allocation of defined in equation (1), among the members. Following usman, it is assumed fixed costs. Following Zusman, it is assumed Because of the nonprofit nature of cooperative is p ed that every member's share of FCC is predeterassociations, CS is entirely returned to the memmined, although Zusman's analysis would sugbers. Thus, the following payment constraint mined, although Zusman's analysis would sugmust hold:
gest that no equilibrium vote exists to allocate FCC. Note that under this payment system, the (2) CS = PAYI, value of marginal product that the cooperative i realizes is precisely the payment that the grower where PAY} denotes the payment to grower i receives for that delivery.
A MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
bers are trying to maximize their own net re-MODEL turns. Individual members choose which field (area) to plant and select the varieties planted. Given a payment system to allocate cooper-eties planted. ative surplus among the members, a member
The cooperative is responsible for harvesting the fields planted in the "best" possible sedecides what variety to plant in a given fieldd n the best" possible sequence. The decision to plant a particular field, of sugarcane since different varieties will result q l l l and hence make it available for harvest, is conin different net returns under alternative payen me fr h t is ment systems. In addition, the schedule of deti upon members valuation of deliveries which depends on the prevalent payment system liveries depends on the payment system because w deends on te peaent pyent system tonnage, sugar, and other factors embodied in and grower's cost in equation (6). Thus, the alternative payment systems are linked to the objective contribution of each delivery is given alternative payment systems are linked to the time of delivery.
by equation (6), as viewed by the member. time of delivery.
Further, Lopez and Spreen have shown that when members behave as price takers, a solution analogous to that of Helmberger and Hoos is found Variety Selection Problem when one maximizes members' total net reThe problem of variety selection can be viewed turns. Given the added dimensions of quality, -as one of choosing among alternative techniques space, and time, cooperative equilibrium deof production. Assume that the time span for pends upon the prevalent payment system. Redecisionmaking allows for the selection of vagardless of the payment system, "fairness" in rieties of sugarcane for the fields to be planted.
use of the cooperative processing plant over The characteristics that determine yields, costs, the processing season is achieved through inand processing-capacity use are unique to each dividual delivery quotas based on the amount field of sugarcane (usually 40 acres).
of raw product. In deciding which variety to plant in a given Three sets of constraints that regulate operfield (f) for deliveries in a particular processing ation of a sugarcane cooperative in a given period (t), a member (i) will strive to maximize processing season are processing plant capacity, members' delivery quotas, and the payment con-(6) NRft, = PAYi t-GCi,, straint (no deferred payments or taxes). 4 There are two limits that define processing plant cawhere NRk^ and PAYkf are net returns and paypacity: a lower limit (Ml) which specifies the ment to the grower under payment system k for minimum amount of cane that justifies ecodeliveries of Yf. GCif is the grower's cost nomic operation of the mill and an upper limit incurred in producing Yv. Furthermore, equa-(Mt) which specifies the maximum amount that tion (6) gives the valuation of deliveries from can be processed in a given period. Members' the member's standpoint; i.e., how much that delivery quotas are imposed to induce "fairdelivery is worth to the grower. For instance, ness" in using the processing plant in "good" if the payment is based on raw product, the and "bad" delivery periods. A member's delivgrower will be concerned only with the amount ery in each processing period must be contained of raw product at delivery time.
between the upper quota, Qt, and lower quota, When payment is based on use value, the Qit, for period t. The quotas are used in the payment for Ylf is the value added from the model without questioning the implication of delivery. When balanced with the grower's cost alternative supply control policies. as in equation (6), this payment system leads Assuming that the cooperative objective is to to a production decision analogous to Olson's maximize total net returns under a given paycondition for the optimal amount of a collective ment system, the task of the cooperative is to good (costs and benefits shared in the same maximize: proportion), Zusman's marginal cost pricing in T a marketing cooperative, or to the member's ) To Members' Profinternalization of the marginal revenue product i f t for a "coordinated" cooperative as suggested subject to: by Lopez and Spreen.
(8) Ml < E Wift < Mu Mill Capacity i f Cooperative Maximization Problem (9) Qlt < ZW, <Qit Members' Quotas In the present analysis, it is assumed that the f task of the cooperative is to maximize total net (10) E PAY' -CS=0 Payment Constraint returns of the members provided that the memi (11) NRkf = Max NRkft Variety Selection tion is adjusted for varietal processing quality v (fiber content) with indices obtained from the where Wif is a binary choice variable such that survey. FCC is estimated as the daily mill caWft equals one if field f of member i is harvested pacity in tons times the fixed cost per ton as in time t, and is equal to zero, otherwise.
5 If estimated by the United States Department of E Wft is zero, that field is left idle. For payment Agriculture. Grower's cost per acre is estimated t from secondary data (USDA) and is adjusted with based on raw or finished product, esuation (10) growing cost indices for varieties of cane. Lopez can be written as P = CS/Y and P, CS/Z, represents a more detailed discussion on the escan be written as Py=CS/Y and P,=CS/Z, rePmto o th p e of the e spectively. For a use value payment system, timation of the parameters of the sugarcane equation (7) must be adjusted for fixed coopcooperative for which the model was operaerative costs to obtain the total members' net tionalize returns. FCC is assumed to be shared in a predetermined manner, and hence, it does not influence production decisions. The nested METHODOLOGY optimization in equation (11) determines the The multilevel programming approach disvaluation of deliveries from the members' standcussed by Candler et al. is analytically appropoint and corresponds to the problem given in priate for the solution of the mathematical equation (6). programming problem given by equations (7) through (11). The problem can be conceptualized as a bi-level programming problem: at ESTIMATION OF PARAME S level 1, arrangements for payments (policies) ESTIMATION OF PARAETRS are set where the cooperative's objective is the The parameters of the stated mathematical maximization of total net returns and, at level programming problem are estimated for a sug-2, a member makes production decisions to arcane cooperative operating in South Florida.
maximize net returns taking policies set at level Primary data were collected to estimate Zf and 1 and other members' actions as given. Y, with statistical models similar to those spec- Figure 2 shows the five-step algorithm used ified by Alvarez et al. Predicted Z, and Yi, are to solve the bi-level programming problem.
Step used directly in the estimation of cooperative 1 is to specify a payment system.
Step 2 is to surplus and the specification of the constraints specify an initial "price" for members' delivof the model. The processing season is divided eries. At step 3, a nested optimization is perinto five harvest periods (T=5), each encomformed in which the variety that yields the passing 4 weeks, within which the individual highest net return under a given payment system members' quotas and mill capacity were deis determined for each field harvested during fined. The cooperative under study processed each processing period.
Step 3, then, simulates sugarcane from 800 fields with a daily proa second level decision (members' behavior) cessing capacity of 7,140 tons of cane operating where the valuation of deliveries (objective 140 days (200,000 tons per processing period). contribution) is determined. Once assignment The cooperative is assumed to consist of five of varieties is determined, step 4 consists of members (m =5), each owning 160 fields determining the planting and harvesting pat-(Fl= 160). The five most frequent varieties terns that maximize total net returns given the (planted in 98 percent of fields in the 1979-quotas and limited processing capacity. 80 processing season) are selected as the vaAfter step 4 is completed, members' price is rieties available to a grower (v=A, B, C, D, and computed and compared to the price specified E).
at step 2. If the two prices are equal, the coAll prices and costs are adjusted to December operative is in equilibrium and total payments 1981 dollars. Cooperative costs incurred in harare equal to cooperative surplus. If not, the vesting, transporting, and processing the cane algorithm returns to step 2 and calibrates "price" are assumed to be linear in raw product. The toward convergence of both prices. By construcper unit costs were obtained from budget figtion, the use value payment system does not ures. A survey was conducted to obtain indices require iterations to achieve price convergence. for the processing and growing costs for the In the case of nonlinear processing cost function sugarcane varieties. The processing cost funcor endogenous fixed cooperative cost shares, an 'Since the decision variables (Wi,) represent fields, member quotas and mill capacity restrictions must be expressed in terms of field rather than tons of sugarcane. To ensure feasibility of the solution,' the model is solved using an initial estimate of member quotas and mill capacity restrictions based upon fields. Next, the tonnage processed for each member in each processing period is computed. If these values are outside either member quotas or mill capacity expressed in tons of sugarcane, the bounds based on fields are calibrated and the model is resolved. The procedure is repeated until the solution is feasible on an actual tonnage basis.
1. Select a Payment System. 2. Initialize "Price" or Payment to a Adjust "Price" Toward Field.
Convergence of 2 and 5. iterative scheme would be needed to obtain an network flow algorithms rather than alternative equilibrium.
solution techniques. The specific adaptation of The algorithm is completed for each of the the above problem to a network flow framework payment systems. Members' profits are comis explained by Lopez. pared and the payment system that yields highest total members' profits is designated as potentially Pareto superior relative to another EMPIRICAL RESULTS EMPIRICAL RESULTS payment system. The procedure embodies optimization subThe bi-level programming problem was solved problems at steps 3 and 4. Optimization at step with the three payment systems defined above. 3 is computationally trivial since it only inPerformance measures for each of the payment volves choosing among five alternative (varisystems are presented in Table 1 . Differences eties) for each field in a given period. The in performance results are due to differences problem at step 4 is an integer programming in the pattern of deliveries, varieties grown and problem (Wft integer) and use of the simplex area of cane planted by the members. method will not ensure integer solution. The Under a use value payment system, the coproblem can be viewed as an assignment proboperative makes total net returns of $4,271,419 lem (assigning fields to processing periods) for a single processing season, the highest of which can be formulated as an equivalent transall the scenarios considered, Table 1 . Payment portation problem. Bradley et al. show that any based on sugar delivered ranked second with capacitated transshipment problem, of which total net returns of $2,304,719 which reprethe transportation problem is a special case, sents a loss of $1,966,700 from the use value can be expressed as a network flow problem. payment system solution. Payment based on the They show that computation time can be reamount of raw product results in $2,251,238 duced up to 200 times by using specialized total net returns, which represents a loss of would a member located at some distance from is better off with cane-based payment by the plant be willing to pay higher transportation $53,969. The redistributional impact among costs? alternative payment arrangements is not surThe use of quotas throughout the payment prising since individual members have comscenarios insured more even distribution of net parative advantages in producing cane or sugar.
returns (Lopez) . In spite of these limitations, However, each member is better off under a the results support the case for a strong manuse value payment system than in any other agement or board of directors to implement system. rules that coerce members into producing efThe difference in total net returns between ficiently. This is also supportive of Hobbes' cane-based and sugar-based payments is $53,481 theory that states that one way to insure the which is not as large as one could expect. Two preferred outcome is to establish a government reasons are envisioned to provide, in part, an (management or board of directors) with sufexplanation for the phenomenon. First, the vaficient power to ensure that it is in every man's riety-choice set used in the estimated model interest to choose the preferred outcome. may not allow a large variation in quantityquality choice. Second, the amount of sugar may not be independent of the amount of cane.
CONCLUDING REMARKS Since cooperative revenues depend on sugar, while cooperative variable costs depend on cane
The purpose of this paper is to assess the tonnage, under a cane-based or sugar-based payimpact of alternative payment arrangements on ment system, highly productive growers (high the performance of Florida sugarcane prosugar content, low cane tonnage) are penalized cessing cooperatives. A bi-level mathematical for their deliveries which in turn leads to unprogramming model is developed for the probderproduction as in the case of externalities. A lem. The empirical results indicate that by using use value payment system leads to the highest a payment based on use value of the deliveries, raw product price (Py = 20.23), the greatest a cooperative can significantly increase memamount of raw product (974,172 tons of cane) bers' total net returns when compared to payand the greatest amount of sugar (94,390 tons). ment based on raw or finished product. The differences between total net returns with As for the manner in which Florida sugarcane a use value payment system and the other syscooperatives are currently operating, the results tems show the importance of the internalization suggest that these cooperatives should devise a of the cooperative processing costs and revepayment system that charges each member for nues by individual cooperative members. The the cost of processing deliveries. Such a charge difference among payment systems lies in the must be based on tonnage of sugarcane adjusted valuation of deliveries made by the members.
for processing quality of the deliveries. This measure is likely to enhance the performance low implementation costs regardless of the inof these cooperatives. centives transmitted to the members. Another An important limitation of the analysis is that limitation of the model is its nonstochastic nait ignores the monitoring and enforcement costs ture. Risk considerations such as freeze tolerof the various payment arrangements. The magance of the varieties of cane are factors that nitude of these costs could result in a secondgrowers incorporate in their variety selection best solution with a payment arrangement with decisions.
